

## Chapter 31 - A True Midterm: The 1966 Election

Mid-term elections are an opportunity for the electorate to render a judgment on the incumbent president and his party. Such an appraisal is delivered through a range of electoral opportunities – local and state elections, the one-third of US Senate seats in play, and the totality of the Federal House of Representatives, with the last being presumptively the most indicative. In actuality, even the House vote has its limitations. The electorate that shows up in off years is substantially smaller in numbers than those that vote in presidential years; it is a different collection of people. And in voting for one's representative, the voter is not voting for or against the incumbent president. As Speaker Thomas O'Neill would be widely quoted as saying, "all politics is local."<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, the 1966 mid-term, coming as it did after the rash of Great Society initiatives by Democratic Pres. Lyndon Johnson and the overwhelmingly Democratic Congress and in the midst of Johnson's increasingly disastrous Vietnam War and among rising agitation by African Americans encouraged by Administration and congressional equal rights legislation, was widely considered a judgment on the President and the Party.<sup>2</sup>

Johnson's approval rating fell from 66% in November 1965 to 44% in October 1966, but Democrats did not lose the House in 1966. The Party still would hold 248 seats to the Republicans' 187, but 75 of the Democratic seats would be in the South and another 28 in the Border. Only 21 survived of 48 pro-Johnson Democrats first elected in 1964. Of the 38 districts taken from Republicans in 1964, 24 were reclaimed. The Democratic Party retained control of the House, but the Great Society legislative initiative was over.

There was another tempest blowing through House districts at this time, that of redistricting. In three decisions from 1962 to 1964 the Supreme Court ended its obliviousness to the crucial role of the definition of legislative and congressional districts in the Constitutional guarantee of "republican government" in the states and decreed that districts for both houses in state legislatures and congressional districts must contain approximately equal numbers of people within each state.<sup>3</sup> Over not too long a time, lower court interpretations of these decisions decreed that "approximately" was not equal enough. The effect of these judgments was a shift of representation from over-represented rural areas to under-represented urban regions, particularly so in state legislatures. As equal populations among districts became the rising standard, districts as indicators of communities of interest became less and less important and district lines became more and more arbitrary. There was a major exception to this last sentence in that interpretations by the Department of Justice and the courts of the requirements of the Voting Rights Act would define a critical community of interest to be preserved through districts, even if geographically Rorschach, as that of populations of racial minorities, particularly African Americans.

Efforts by state legislatures to address the requirements of the three decisions for the 1966 elections were, however, relatively free of the impetus for equality of populations or creation of majority-minority districts, though these considerations would come into play in the very near term.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> O'Neill attributed this to his father. O'Neill with Novak, 36.

<sup>2</sup> In particular, see Busch, 100-14.

<sup>3</sup> *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

<sup>4</sup> In *Karcher v. Daggett*, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), the Supreme Court would enshrine equality of district populations, confirming the trend of lower court rulings. In *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), the Court would define the

Twenty-four states redistricted for the 1966 House elections. Eleven of these included thirteen members of the Class of '46. Only six of the seventeen states with our incumbent Class members had redistricted between the 1960 census and the 1962 election. Alabama's was the most severe. Losing a seat due to the census, the State decreed the nine old districts would nominate Democrats who would then run in a statewide free-for-all run-off for the eight seats left to the State and then contest in the general election with any Republican nominees. Robert Jones had to compete for the support of the registered voters of the 2,883,115 people not of his old District (according to the census of two years earlier), but, then, the other candidates enjoyed a similar challenge.

Redrawing an incumbent's district posed the problem of selling oneself to voters new to the representative, although rarely on the scale of that faced by Jones. That was not primarily a problem of public knowledge of the candidate by new constituents, for most of the existing constituents could not name their Federal representative in any event. Given that news media were not bounded by congressional districts and the paucity of coverage of representatives by the media, it was rather an issue of contact. Representatives mailed their constituents newsletters or offers of government assistance, utilizing their franks as much as possible. During primaries and elections such proactive contact increased, and the candidate or surrogate may have even appeared at the door of the constituent. The political web represented by such stand-ins and constructed by a representative to facilitate contact and reelection must be built anew in an area not previously part of the district.

Constituents also contacted their representative for assistance with government or to make their opinions known. A survey in the 1970s would report that 20% of constituents said they had contacted their representative. Few contacted a representative other than their own. The number is small, but so was voting turnout. In 1962, 45% of the voting age population in the country reported that they cast a ballot.<sup>5</sup> These figures argue that nearly half of voters in an off-year election had contacted their representative. In the new territory aggregating to an incumbent, very few of the voters would have contacted the representative or been contacted by him or her. In the general election, partisan loyalty or assumption would have served to offset the relative ignorance of the individual representative, either for or against the incumbent. In the primary, without the partisan flag, the lack of contact was critical except in areas of strong factional organization.

Robert Jones' survival in the run-off was aided by the fact that his old District was oversized in population – six per cent larger than the standard. He ran against eight other Democratic nominees in the run-off, although the number of seats was reduced to a total of eight. The seven counties of Jones' old District cast 13% of the vote in the run-off compared to the 12% of the population his District represented.<sup>6</sup> In the general election, partisanship was important. There were three Republican candidates and one States' Rights candidates, and the eight Democrats, including Jones, easily swamped them.

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requirements for a majority-minority district, already a matter of Justice Department review. In *Shelby County v. Holder*, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) the Court would invalidate Justice Department review. The impact of computers on redistricting is outside the chronology of this work, but by the 1990s, many districts would begin to resemble less an ink-blot, and certainly not a community, but rather a Jackson Pollock work of political art.

<sup>5</sup> A 2013 survey by Gallup would find that 35% could name their representative. Elizabeth Mendes, "Americans Down on Congress, OK With Own Representative," May 9, 2013, at [news.gallup.com](http://news.gallup.com). Conway, 86. *Statistical Abstract*, table 455.

<sup>6</sup> The use of the term "standard" here means the population of a district if the total population of the state were divided by the number of seats in the House of Representatives. The turnout figures are based on the average of the nine candidates' votes, not the total votes cast for the candidates for eight slots.

Alabama redistricted for the 1964 election, but the boundaries of Jones's District did not change. Now his District was undersized among the fewer districts, eight per cent smaller than the standard. Under the "one man, one vote" decisions of the Supreme Court, a Federal panel in 1965 ruled the new Alabama districts unconstitutional, citing the range between the Fourth and Sixth districts, which were respectively 15% under and 23% over the standard. Alabama, reflecting a general reluctance of legislatures in states without large metropolitan areas, balked at dividing Jefferson County, home of Birmingham, resulting in the large Sixth District.<sup>7</sup> With the court decision, they had to face the desanctification of county boundaries and divided Jefferson among three districts. The Sixth District was reduced to 8% over the standard. Jones's Eighth District was untouched and now the smallest in the state by population, still 8% under the standard.

Of the 17 states with members of the Class, Alabama was the only one to experience redistricting in all of 1962, 1964, and 1966, yet Jones's District did not change. Three other states experienced two rounds of redistricting in these three elections – Mississippi, Missouri, and Pennsylvania.

Mississippi, like Alabama, lost a House seat in the 1960 census and solved the problem for 1962 by simply combining two districts, leaving that of John Bell Williams untouched. Unsurprisingly, given that the new combined Second District was 40% larger than the standard, a Federal court mandated redistricting. The Legislature, which was elected in odd-numbered years and met biennially, found itself working in 1966 to come up with new districts for the 1966 election. With a June 7 primary date, the new plan was finally adopted on April 6. The Legislature wanted to create congressional districts that were majority white, now that the Federal government was actively promoting the voter registration of black Mississippians, but this meant dividing the so-called "Delta" region, which had the largest proportion of black citizens as well as a tradition of being a single congressional district. White supremacy finally won over Delta supremacy, and the Delta was divided among three districts.<sup>8</sup>

The effect on Williams's District was the paring off of one county to one of the new cross-Delta configurations. The change moved Williams's District slightly away from the standard, from one per cent undersized to two per cent. Overall, the Legislature came up with districts with a small range from 3% under to 3% over the standard.

Missouri also lost a House seat in the 1960 census. When Frank Karsten was first elected to Congress his District was wholly within the City of St. Louis. In 1950 the census counted 856,796 people in the City. In that census the State lost two House seats, the General Assembly expanded Karsten's District into St. Louis County, and nearly doubled its population from 263,444 to 427,856. For the 1962 election, the legislature cut out some of the County area and tinkered with the line in the City. The total City population had dropped to 750,026 but the County's numbers swelled, as had the existing District's to 568,029. The 1961 redistricting reduced this to 466,482, which still put Karsten with 8% more constituents than standard. Also, thanks to moving the line in the city, the Representative gained 110,509 new constituents, 24% of his District's new total. Nevertheless, Karsten had little trouble surviving the primary, and his overwhelmingly Democratic District returned him easily. 1964 was even more of a cakewalk, but in 1965, under court order, the legislature took out its maps again. The 1961 districts ranged from a low of 12% under to 17% over standard, the latter being a St. Louis County district.

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<sup>7</sup> *CQWR*, September 16, 1966, 2010-1. Curiously enough, a piece of Jefferson County had been carved off in 1964 and moved into the 5<sup>th</sup> district. Why the legislature would swallow this and not the more equitable effort a year later is testament to the randomness of legislative rationales. *CQWR*, September 11, 1964, 2137.

<sup>8</sup> *CQWR*, September 16, 1966, 2072-3.

New districts enacted in August 1965 yielded a range of 10% under to 10% over standard with Karsten's now the largest district by population. More tinkering in the City yielded no new areas for the District, but the legislature added back the County township they had removed in 1961. The resulting new 81,648 people for Karsten were not really new, he had represented the area from 1952 to 1960. The Court was more distressed than the Representative. 364 days after the Governor signed the redistricting plan, the Court would find it to have an unconstitutionally wide range of populations but, it now being August 1966, allowed it to be used in that year's contests.<sup>9</sup>

Of the twelve members of the Class of '46 from Pennsylvania, only Paul Dague was left in the House. He was the only one of the nineteen incumbent members of the Class to retire in 1966. On February 14, 1966, at the age of 67, Dague announced that he planned to relax. Although no new district had been defined for him, the Governor announced he would call a special session to redo the 1962 districts, and Paul Dague's District, at 17% over standard, was likely to change. His District had been the same since 1932, and the General Assembly would lop off one of its two counties and add half of another. The Republican organizations in the two counties endorsed the incumbent first-term Representative from the half-county, and Dague backed him. Four years younger than Dague, he served until he died at the age of 68, the same age as Dague at the end of his own term. Dague really did retire and to Downingtown, his hometown since 1941.<sup>10</sup>

South Carolina did not exactly redistrict twice. The General Assembly passed a bill in 1963 transferring one county between two districts at the request of the legislative delegation from that county. Much talk of other changes to the 1932 districts came to naught until 1965, when a suit in Federal court incentivized the legislature. But no resolution was reached until a second suit nearly a year later prompted a new plan. Bryan Dorn's District, 20% under standard after 1960, added one county with 81,038 residents, 20% of Dorn's new total, and became one percent over standard.<sup>11</sup>

Maryland's representation in the House benefitted from the 1960 census, but the General Assembly ducked the issue of redistricting by declaring the new seat to be At-large. Democrat Edward Garmatz' District was now phenomenally undersized. Completely contained within the City of Baltimore, whose population was static while the suburbs of the City and of Washington boomed, the District was 33% under standard. It was not even the smallest Maryland district, which was 37% under standard while the largest was 83% over. Hervey Machen had almost three times as many constituents as Rogers Morton, who was the brother of Class of '46 Kentuckian Thruston Morton, now a Senator. And then there was the At-large Rep. Carlton Sickles, who counted four times as many constituents as Rogers Morton.

A 1964 court order required redistricting for the 1966 election, while two previous plans had already been blocked by petition. A plan adopted in 1965 was again subject to petition, which placed a referendum vote on the 1966 general election ballot. The State's Constitution provided a way to avoid the petition process if both houses of the legislature passed a plan by two-thirds vote. Both houses did so, though they passed different plans and failed to agree. Called back into special session, again the two houses could not agree on a plan. The Court was petitioned, including by Garmatz and a number of other Federal representatives, to intervene and draw the districts. On May 3, 1966, the Court redistricted the

<sup>9</sup> CQWR, March 18, 1966, 612-3. *The Maryville Daily Forum*, August 5, 1966.

<sup>10</sup> *Pottstown Mercury*, February 15, 1966. *Gettysburg Times*, January 6, 1966. *Delaware County Daily Times*, March 11, April 19, 1966. *Hazleton Standard-Speaker*, December 4, 1974.

<sup>11</sup> CQWR, February 5, 1965, 180; September 16, 1966, 2112-4. *Florence Morning News*, January 19, 1966.

State. A major point of contention in the legislative process was whether to protect the existing Baltimore representatives by extending their districts into the suburbs or to effectively draw Baltimore versus suburban districts. The Court sided with the Baltimore representatives.<sup>12</sup> Garmatz' District was extended into Anne Arundel County. As a result, his new constituents were about 36% new to him and the District was only one per cent under standard. It was not the smallest, but the smallest was still only one per cent under and the largest was one per cent over.

New York, Massachusetts, and Minnesota redistricted for the 1962 election. Abraham Multer's Brooklyn District had added 154,677 constituents that were new to him, 34% of his total, which thus shifted from 14% under standard to 11% over. It was not until 1967 that a Federal court would rule the districting plan unconstitutional. Democrat Harold Donohue in Massachusetts had found himself with a bare 40,834 new constituents as his District shifted from 5% under to 4% over standard. The plan would be found unconstitutional in 1967.<sup>13</sup> Democrat John Blatnik in Minnesota gained 65,122 new constituents, moving him from 22% under to 7% still under standard. There would be no new redistricting until 1971.

Indiana had not redistricted since 1942. A Democratic legislator had brought suit, but a Federal court ruled in March 1964 that the year's electoral process was too advanced for it to intervene. This was too bad for the Republicans, as the Democrats flipped both houses of the General Assembly in the Goldwater debacle and got to draw the lines in 1965.<sup>14</sup> The new plan placed Ralph Harvey with fellow Republican incumbent Richard Roudebush. The old districts had a range from 30% under to 65% over standard. Harvey's District was a modest 7% under. The new plan took away three counties from Harvey and added two and a piece of Marion County, which hosted Indianapolis. Still, the District acquired only 63,016 new constituents, 16% of the total of the new District, but one of the new constituents was Roudebush. The District stayed 7% under.

William McCulloch's District in Ohio was 12% under standard in a District that was drawn for the 1952 election. The State gained a House seat in 1960 but made it an At-large seat and passed on redistricting. Ignoring the At-large district, the range of district populations was from 42% under to 80% over standard. Facing suits to force redistricting, the Governor called a special session to meet after the 1964 election to redraw the lines. Democrats had managed to take a draw with Republicans in the Senate, giving the lame duck General Assembly an incentive to act quickly. The Republican plan was signed into law on December 29, 1964.<sup>15</sup> McCulloch's District lost a county and added a county. He found himself with 29,633 new constituents, eight per cent of his total, and a district still 12% under standard.

Democrat Joe Evins' 1952 District in Tennessee was only two percent under standard, but the range for the State's nine districts was from 44% under to 58% over standard. The most populous district was coterminous with Shelby County, home of Memphis, and Charles Baker, head of the County's governing body, filed suit in 1964 asking for redistricting. He was the Baker of *Baker v. Carr*, in which the Supreme Court held that the failure of the Tennessee General Assembly to redistrict since 1901 was a denial of equal protection to the voters. The battle in the legislature over redistricting, no better or worse than in most states, was described by a columnist in the *Kingsport Times* as "friend turned against friend, political ally against political ally." Shelby County was divided among three districts and the range of the nine

<sup>12</sup> *The New York Times*, September 22, 1964. *CQWR*, June 4, 1965, 1066; September 2, 1966, 1916; September 16, 1966, 2058-60. *The Morning Herald* (Hagerstown), April 12, 1966. *The Cumberland News*, April 26, 1966.

<sup>13</sup> *CQWR*, February 24, 1967, 285; May 26, 1967, 874.

<sup>14</sup> *CQWR*, April 3, 1964, 670; September 16, 1966, 2042-3.

<sup>15</sup> *Chillicothe Gazette*, July 25, 1964. *CQWR*, September 16, 1966, 2097-8. *The Cincinnati Enquirer*, December 18, 1964

districts was reduced to 13% under to 17% over. Evins lost two counties and added another, giving him 39,133 new constituents, 10% of his total, and a district four percent over standard. Two new suits were filed against the new plan and a Federal court ruled in November 1965 that the plan was unconstitutional, but the court allowed it to be used for the 1966 elections.<sup>16</sup>

Texas gained a House seat from the 1960 census but elected it At-large. A 1957 redistricting which eliminated the At-large district resulting from the 1950 census added two counties to the District of Omar Burleson and three counties to that of Olin Teague but left them 31% and 40% under standard, respectively. A struggle to redistrict in 1961 to avoid the return of the At-large solution foundered in large part on a desire to keep the sole Republican Rep. Bruce Alger boxed in within his 128% over standard District and to protect Speaker Sam Rayburn's 48% under standard District. Three suits filed in 1963 resulted in an October ruling that the districts were unconstitutional and that new districts must be drawn for the 1964 election or that all 23 House contests be held at large. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black stayed the order.

The Supreme Court then in March 1964 upheld the lower court ruling but allowed a rehearing at that court about the At-large order. The lower court gave the State until August 1, 1965, to redistrict. The new districts for 1966 made wholesale changes in those of Burleson and Teague. Burleson lost two counties but added twelve. Teague lost four and added only two and portions of two others, but those portions were of the metropolitan counties of Tarrant (containing Fort Worth) and Dallas. Teague's rural constituency became by over half a metropolitan district. Teague added 210,595 new constituents, 55% of his total. Burleson added 131,560, 35%, but as he himself said, "That area has the same interests we have...." In his newsletter, Teague remained positive and, unlike many of his colleagues, supportive of the principle of one man, one vote. The districts of both Burleson and Teague remained under standard at 10% and 9% respectively, and new suits resulted in the court allowing the plan for 1966 but decreeing another plan to be enacted for 1968. As for Alger and Rayburn, the former lost his seat in the Goldwater disaster and the latter died in 1961.<sup>17</sup>

Virginia redistricted in 1952 after gaining a House seat and made a slight adjustment between two districts in 1960 that added a few voters to Porter Hardy's District, due to an annexation by Norfolk. The State then passed after no change in House seats following the 1960 census. Hardy's District was 25% over standard and Watkins Abbitt's was 11% under. These were not the extremes of the State's ten districts which ranged from 21% under to 36% over. Suits were filed in both State and Federal courts and the Federal court deferred action until the Virginia Supreme Court made its decision.<sup>18</sup>

On January 18, 1965, the State court declared the districts unconstitutional and ordered at-large elections until redistricting. It was reported, and denied by the participants, that Hardy, Abbitt, and two other representatives then met to draw up a redistricting plan. Virginia would elect a new General Assembly in 1965, which produced worries about the validity of a lame duck legislature under old redistricting producing a new congressional map, against fears of trusting it to a newly redistricted legislature. Abbitt urged action by the rural-dominated old legislature while Hardy seemed to support action by the new, more urban body, reflecting the nature of their existing districts. The Governor went

<sup>16</sup> CQWR, September 16, 1966, 2119. *Kingsport Times*, May 16, 1965.

<sup>17</sup> CQWR, September 28, 1962, 1682-3; October 25, 1963, 1851-2; November 1, 1963, 1883; March 6, 1964, 474; September 16, 1966, 2122-3. *Abilene Reporter-News*, April 28, 1964. *The Mexia Daily News*, March 26, 1965. For Teague's new district: 191,137 from the Tarrant and Dallas counties and 188,594 from the other nine counties. These are 1960 figures. By 1966 the metropolitan share was undoubtedly more.

<sup>18</sup> *The Bee*, May 27, 1964.

with the old legislature in calling a special session and a plan was enacted on September 7, 1965.<sup>19</sup> Abbitt lost two rural counties while picking up two independent cities. Neither Colonial Heights, the white flight twin of Petersburg, already in Abbitt's district, and Chesapeake, the suburbs of Norfolk and new to him, were exactly metropolitan, but his 83,234 new constituents were now 22% of his total. The redistricting bumped his District up to 3% over standard. Hardy added no new areas; rather, Chesapeake had been part of his District, which now was still over standard, but only 6% so.

Three of the incumbent Class of '46 experienced no restricting for the 1962, 1964, or 1966 elections.

Louisiana had not changed its congressional districts since 1911. What is surprising is that the population variations among the eight districts were not any more extreme. The independent City of New Orleans had been divided in two districts in 1911 with each also including suburban territory. Despite the City's population increasing from 339,075 in 1910 to 627,525 in 1960, the two districts were only 10% and 23% over standard. The biggest district in 1960 was that of twelve parishes centered on Baton Rouge that was 32% over standard. The smallest, a rural district in the center of the State was 35% under. Otto Passman's was 15% under. A suit was filed in May 1964, but the Federal court did not push the Legislature to act speedily. Seven members of the House delegation, including Passman, drew up a plan, and when the Legislature finally acted in July 1966 the members were reported approving. The new plan would take effect for the 1968 election.<sup>20</sup>

Oklahoma redistricted in 1951 and punted after the 1960 census, leaving the State with the largest range in sizes of (non-at-large) districts in the country and Carl Albert with the smallest number of constituents other than the member from Alaska. His District was 41% under standard. A suit was filed and the Legislature began work on a new plan in 1965. After consulting with the House delegation, the Democratic Legislature passed the representatives' plan, and Oklahoma's first Republican Governor, Henry Bellmon, vetoed it. Bellmon set up an office near the Senate chamber; so, Senate leaders locked the chamber. The Speaker of the State House accused Bellmon of "giving roads and taking them away" to influence individual legislators. Six days after his first veto, Bellmon vetoed a second plan, but this time the Legislature managed to override. Thanks to an arcane rule, the plan could not go into effect for 90 days, giving Republicans time to successfully petition the plan to a referendum. The plan was voted down by the citizenry on election day 1966.<sup>21</sup>

Finally, there was Wisconsin. The State redistricted for the 1964 election, and Glenn Davis was not sent back to the House until that vote. The range of districts was 3% under to 3% over standard and the districts would hold until 1972. Davis' was 1% over.

Wisconsin was the rare exception. Of the 45 states with more than one representative in the House, 25 redistricted for 1962, 8 for 1964, 24 for 1966, 17 for 1968, and 6 for 1970. After the 1970 census, 41 would redistrict. Representatives would represent nearly equal numbers of people, most of whom did not contact their representative nor even vote for or against him or her. For the individual American there would be increasing confusion about which district they were in and therefore who their representative was. Rural districts would become more diverse and metropolitan districts less so. Districts would become

<sup>19</sup> CQWR, September 16, 1966, 2131. *The Progress-Index*, February 5, June 2, July 19 & 23, 1965.

<sup>20</sup> *The Shreveport Times*, May 22, 1964, March 4, 1966. *The Alexandria Daily Town Talk*, June 21, 1966. *Lake Charles American-Press*, July 7, 1966.

<sup>21</sup> CQWR, September 16, 1966, 2102-3; January 5, 1968, 22. *The Lawton Constitution*, April 11, July 15 & 16 & 20, 1965. *The Checotah News*, July 23, 1965.

more gerrymandered as existing political boundaries were rendered more irrelevant. The security of the seat of the individual representative should in theory have become more tenuous as districts could no longer be frozen for the member, yet, thanks in large part to the increasing gerrymandering, this did not prove to be the case. From 1952 to 1960, there were 25 redistrictings and 65 new individuals were elected to the House. From 1962 to 1970, there were 80 redistrictings and 51 new individuals.<sup>22</sup>

Thirteen members of the Class had districts that were altered for 1966, but only Dague failed to contest them. Of the rest, Ralph Harvey of Indiana faced the worst situation, being placed by the Democratic General Assembly in a district with another Republican incumbent. The new District, enacted on March 9, 1965, prompted rumors of Harvey's retirement, which he vigorously denied. Only 16% of the new District's constituents were new to Harvey and commentators gave him the edge against Richard Roudebush, who was in his third term. Roudebush was farthest to the right in a right-wing Republican Indiana delegation and in the campaign jacked up his opposition to the Great Society, liberal universities, the North Vietnamese, and black folks. Harvey's campaign was lower in volume, relying heavily on support from the Party organizations and the voters of the counties he had represented. His campaign was well represented by a newspaper ad he ran: "Do you want a TALKER or a DOER for your Congressman?" The voters apparently preferred the talker, giving Roudebush 56% of the primary vote. Harvey told friends he would retire and split his time between his home in Henry County and his condo in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.<sup>23</sup> He was 65. Roudebush won election and stayed in the House two more terms until an unsuccessful run for the Senate.

The Class of '46 was aging. Roudebush was only 48 in 1966, 52 when he would run for the Senate. The youngest Classmate was Williams, Roudebush's age. Dorn was next at 50. The Senate did beckon the South Carolinian that year, but it would have been a race against incumbent Republican Strom Thurmond. His Party badly wanted Dorn to make the race, but the Representative's ties to Thurmond when the former Governor was a Democrat had been strong. Dorn, an opponent of the Voting Rights Act, was now faced with the fact that he might have to ask black constituents for their votes. His District was 25% African American in 1960. That was not a lot by South Carolina standards, the State being 35% nonwhite; the latter figure was a disincentive for Dorn to run statewide. In the District the demography meant that if he had a strong Republican opponent for the House, black voters could potentially provide half of the Representative's necessary bare majority. Perhaps Dorn would take on Thurmond, even more of a public white supremacist, if he faced a strong Republican challenger for the House.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> *CQ Almanac* 1988, 55-6. Two new seats added to the House for representatives from the new states of Alaska and Hawaii and 1958 and 1959 are excluded. The number of redistrictings is from Lewis, DeVine, Pitcher, and Martis.

<sup>23</sup> *The Anderson Herald*, March 10, 1965; February 20, 1966. *CQWR*, April 23, 1965, 783. *The Kokomo Tribune, the Kokomo Dispatch*, April 8, 1966. *The Terre Haute Star*, April 13, 23, 1966. *The Terre Haute Tribune*, April 27, 1966. *Anderson Daily Bulletin*, May 2, 1966. *Rushville Republican*, April 27, May 2 & 14, 1966. Roudebush's singling out the W.E.B. DuBois Club at Indiana University for vilification is noteworthy. On the other hand, he did vote for passage of both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, after voting to recommit the latter.

<sup>24</sup> *The Index-Journal*, October 30, 1948; February 10, 1964. January 13, March 3 & 14. *CQWR*, February 18, 1966, 405.

On March 22, the District Republican Convention nominated John Grisso for the House, but on April 7 Dorn declared for reelection.<sup>25</sup> The Representative faced no opponent for renomination, perhaps because he was already casting for black votes. Congressional Quarterly quoted him in February 1966:

Southerners have been brilliantly defending lost causes for 150 years. Now it is time to start turning our energy toward positive causes. This is the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and it is high time South Carolina faced up to it. It is a time of change and you can accept change without necessarily liking it. This is a time of unprecedented prosperity and an unlimited future and you ought to be thanking government instead of damning it. I refute racism. We've done things for the Negro but now it is time to do things with him.<sup>26</sup>

He claimed that his opposition to the Voting Rights Act was that it did not apply nationally but was punitive against the South.

Grisso, known as "Bud," was another Republican convert, having been an elected Democratic prosecutor. He was twelve years younger than Dorn and sought to tie the Representative to Pres. Lyndon Johnson, to the War on Poverty, to integration, and to "black power." While Congressional Quarterly thought Dorn "recently has shown signs of moderation," his congressional service and campaign for reelection were best summed up by one of his newspaper ads: Endorsed by Americans for Constitutional Action, a zero rating from Americans for Democratic Action, a supporter of veterans, the textile industry, the farmer, Social Security, and public works - "Champion of property rights, state rights, individual freedom and better tomorrow."<sup>27</sup> Dorn got 58% of the vote. It was not a close vote, but Dorn had never before gotten less than 93% in the general election.

The odd thing about Dorn's race was that it was as close as it was. Certainly, South Carolina Democrats like Thurmond or Grisso or Rep. Albert Watson had been jumping to the Republican Party or like Democratic Gov. Edward Byrne endorsing Republicans, and South Carolina had not cast more than a bare majority for a Democratic presidential candidate since 1944, but most of the State's Democrats remained at least nominally true and victorious. The election was a shot across Dorn's bow. No other Southern Classmate, or Albert in Little Dixie Oklahoma for that matter, fared as badly as the South Carolinian.

Of this group, Robert Jones had the next worst time of it. Rumors of a slate of Democratic House candidates from out-spoken segregationist Gov. George Wallace did not come to pass; Jones was unopposed for nomination but not for election. Don Mayhall, 37, a Decatur attorney and "staunch conservative" ran against Jones, but the Goldwater wave had passed. Gov. Wallace remained a Democrat and, barred from a consecutive term, ran his wife to succeed him. She swamped her Republican opponent, one of the House members brought in on Goldwater's coattails. The State Democratic Executive Committee elected a nationally loyalist Democrat as Chair and chose a Wallace associate as vice chair and adopted a resolution to endorse all Democrats from senator and governor to the lowest county office. It also did not help Southern Republicans that Richard Nixon, back in the national Republican Party's driver's seat, released a statement in May saying, "Southern Republicans must not climb aboard the sinking ship of racial injustice.... They should leave it to the George Wallaces and the [Sen.] Lister Hills to squeeze the last ounces of political juice from the rotting fruit of racial injustice." Jones took 72%, his worst showing in a single seat race but only seven points worse than in 1960.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup> *The Index-Journal*, March 23, April 7, 1966.

<sup>26</sup> *CQWR*, February 13, 1966, 405.

<sup>27</sup> *The Index-Journal*, May 9, September 23, October 8 & 10, November 5, 1966. *Florence Morning News*, October 7, 1966. *CQWR*, July 22, 1966, 1516.

<sup>28</sup> *CQWR*, May 20, 1966, 1041; August 12, 1966, 1740; August 20, 1965, 1658; October 7, 1966, 2351.

Albert also had no primary opposition and a Republican opponent. Whit Pate, like Grisso was an apostate Democrat, 38, and an attorney. Albert received 77%, consistent with his usual performance. On the other hand, Pate was not even a registered Republican and was snubbed by Republican leaders. He had been a central figure the previous year in a grand jury investigation of payoffs to legislators on a horse racing bill. He was arraigned in January 1966 on tax evasion, partly due to non-declaration of income from the payoff scandal. Given all this, it is noteworthy that he could take 23% of the vote.<sup>29</sup>

None of the other Southern Classmates even drew a Republican opponent, though three met third party or independent candidates in the general election.

Abbitt was stretched the most. First, he had to fend off a revolt from the Democrats of Petersburg, whose Central Committee resolved that the Representative should resign his chairship of the Virginia Democratic Party. Petersburg Democrats also cast around for a primary opponent for Abbitt and settled on Lewis Curling, largely because he hailed from Chesapeake, newly included in the District and part of the Norfolk metropolitan area. Curling was a 40-year-old attorney with no electoral experience. He relied on a large black turnout in a district that was 42% black after the new redistricting, but black registered voters, even with the Voting Rights Act, were a smaller proportion.<sup>30</sup> Abbitt breezed with 68% of the vote. Still, it was his first contested primary.

No Republican candidate emerged in a district that was historically the bedrock of the Democratic Byrd organization in Virginia. Goldwater had taken the old District with 51% of the vote, but on racial issues, the major motivating factor of the vote in the District, Abbitt was more attuned with Goldwater than was Republican candidate Linwood Holton in the 1965 gubernatorial election.<sup>31</sup>

Abbitt's third party opponent was of the Virginia Conservative Party, which ran candidates in 1960 and got a new lease on life in reaction to Lt. Gov. Mills Godwin's participation in the Johnson presidential campaign in 1964. Godwin came out of the "Massive Resistance" campaign of the Byrd organization, and now was backing the great race-mixer Johnson. The Conservatives were simpatico with Abbitt but decided to try to force him into leaving the liberalizing Democratic Party. Abbitt campaigned for Godwin in the gubernatorial contest in 1965. He now met for 75 minutes with Conservative leaders but rejected the party switch, which would have cost him his chairship of the Tobacco Subcommittee in the House, a critical matter for his District. The Conservatives then nominated Edward Silverman to oppose Abbitt. Silverman, a newspaperman on a weekly and who was the Conservatives' vice-presidential candidate in 1960, described his opposition by saying, "Mr. Abbitt is a fine man, but he is not in a fine party."<sup>32</sup>

Reportedly, some black leaders in the District encouraged support for Silverman as a short-lived way to get rid of the segregationist Abbitt. More significantly, there was an organized write-in effort for African American S.W. Tucker, who had taken 31% against Abbitt in 1964 as an independent candidate on the ballot. Tucker's campaign distributed "paste-on write-ins" for use, but elections officials invalidated the ballots using them. Tucker still officially received 12% of the vote. Silverman took 22%, and Abbitt was reelected with 66%, only three points lower than his win over Tucker in 1964.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>29</sup> *CQWR*, October 7, 1966, 2365. *Miami Daily News-Record*, January 3 & 4, 1966.

<sup>30</sup> *The Progress-Index*, December 11, 1964; April 8 & 13 & 15, July 13, 1966. *The Washington Post, Times-Herald*, July 13, 1966.

<sup>31</sup> Bass and DeVries, 350-1.

<sup>32</sup> Sweeney, 334. Earl Black, 116. *The Progress-Index*, February 20, May 8, June 25 & 26, 1966. Atkinson *Dynamic*, 176-7. *The Danville Register*, October 31, 1965; May 15, 1966.

<sup>33</sup> *CQWR*, October 7, 1966, 2374. Eisenberg, 38. A suit under the Voting Rights Act to reverse the invalidation of the paste-on write-ins was dismissed by a federal court in May 1967. *The Progress-Index*, May 8, 1967. If Tucker had

Williams faced an independent candidate in the election in Mississippi. Punished by the House Democrats for his support of Goldwater, Williams was said by the lone Mississippi Republican member of the House in 1965 to be planning to run as a Republican for reelection in 1966. Williams immediately denied any such commitment and did run as a Democrat. His primary opponent, Edwin King, 30, a white minister backed by the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, received 22% of the primary vote amid allegations that, Voting Rights Act or not, black voters were denied opportunities, not to register but to vote in various counties.<sup>34</sup>

Williams's independent opponent in November was Emma Sanders, an African American who ran her own private business college. She submitted a petition to appear on the ballot, but the State raised the number of signatures required and disallowed her petition as having too few. Her MFDP sued under the Voting Rights Act, and a Federal court ruled 13 days before the election that she appear on the ballot.<sup>35</sup> She received only 95 votes fewer than King, but the increase in the general election turnout left her with but 18% of the vote. It was only the second time Williams had an election opponent, and Sanders received 21 times as many votes as that Republican in 1950.

Evins, who had become the least conservative of the Class's Southerners, was the third to have a non-Republican opponent. After being unopposed in the primary, Evins lost 10% of the election ballots to an unknown man named William Bean, running as an independent. Bean's 8,061 votes were the most recorded against Evins in an election thus far.

The remaining Southerners had no election opponents, and Hardy and Teague lacked primary challengers as well; this, despite the radical additions to Teague's district. Passman and Burleson, on the other hand, did not get free renominations.

In his first six runs for the House, Passman was opposed for nomination five times, but there had been no challenger since 1956. In 1966 though, a 49-year-old former grocer, retired with disabilities from his World War service, challenged the Representative with "deep concern for the welfare of veterans and small business firms and farmers in our district." Louis LaDart proved to be a problematic candidate, but not to Passman. Two months before the primary he was fined for disturbing the peace and the next month arrested for public drunkenness. LaDart still got 13% of the vote.<sup>36</sup>

Burleson had a greater challenge, not only from a more activist and credible candidate, but from one who was the nephew of another Texas member of the House. Eldon Mahon's uncle, 16-term George Mahon, was Chair of the Appropriations Committee. The Chair said he had no comment about Eldon's run and "never will have." Burleson's opponent was 47, a former judge and district attorney. He had been a vice president of Texas Electric Service Company and with his father owned a radio station and farming interests. He had been active in Pres. Johnson's presidential campaign, and declared himself to be "a Democrat without apologies." There were policy differences between the candidates but not very profound ones. Burleson was more aggressive in support of the war in Vietnam and sliced and diced the

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gotten the 23,682 votes he had received in 1964 with no change in the other 1966 totals, Abbitt would still have won with 64%. The incumbent had little to fear from the new urban addition to his district. He won 66% of the vote in Chesapeake. Tucker won 1% in Chesapeake, so the Silverman return there was a relatively good 33%. [historical.elections.virginia.gov](http://historical.elections.virginia.gov). A Conservative Party opponent of Godwin's in 1965 had taken only 13% statewide.

<sup>34</sup> CQWR, August 6, 1965, 1564. *The Anniston Star*, June 8, 1966.

<sup>35</sup> *Clarion-Ledger*, October 1 & 28, 1966. *The Delta Democrat-Times*, October 12, 1966. *Enterprise-Journal*, October 21, 1966.

<sup>36</sup> *The Monroe News-Star*, March 10, June 30, 1966. *The Alexandria Daily Town Talk*, July 29, 1966.

Great Society initiatives, which Mahon more generally supported. While Mahon sought to place himself slightly to Burleson's left, his real corridor of attack was on Burleson's relevance in the House. He said Burleson's committees were of little significance, that only one of Burleson's bills had become law in the last five years, that his seniority was "a myth." Burleson ran, in part on that seniority, but he could not demonstrate how being the chair of House Administration benefitted his District. Mahon managed only 37%, but it was Burleson's worst primary showing since 1952.<sup>37</sup>

Two Northern Democrats had no opposition in either the primary or the general election, Donohue and Blatnik.

Blatnik, secure in his District, took an active interest in the State Democratic-Farmer-Labor nomination for governor in 1966. Most representatives are happy to avoid making enemies in other intraparty contests, but Blatnik strongly backed Lt. Gov. A.M. Keith for governor at the State Convention. Keith got the endorsement over Gov. Karl Rolvaag, but Rolvaag forced a primary and won easily. There was little if any policy difference between the men. Rolvaag had been polling badly the year before and the DFL Executive Committee asked him not to stand for reelection. Sen. Walter Mondale was appointed by Rolvaag to the seat left vacant by Hubert Humphrey's election as Vice President, and Mondale supported Rolvaag in the nomination fight. Rolvaag had passed over Blatnik, who wanted the appointment. On the other hand, Keith had opposed Blatnik for election as the State's Democratic National Committeeman. Blatnik came out on the wrong side of the gubernatorial nomination, but Rolvaag came out on the wrong side of the election, losing to Republican Harold LeVander.<sup>38</sup>

Democrat Karsten and Republican Glenn Davis got passes in the primaries but had election contests. Republican Robert Sharp challenged Karsten. He was an engineer with McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, 41, and had never run for public office before. He ran against high interest rates, high income taxes, and high prices, but was defeated by Karsten, who took 64%, his worst showing since 1952.<sup>39</sup>

Davis's opponent again was James Buckley, 33, Chief Clerk of the Wisconsin Assembly, and the son of a man who had been on the Board of Supervisors of Davis's home county for eleven years. Buckley declared that Davis was "out of the mainstream," anti-Semitic, pro-pollution, and anti-veteran. The candidates largely agreed on Vietnam. Davis won easily with 64%, a nine-point improvement on his Goldwater-suppressed 1964 showing.<sup>40</sup>

Garmatz had a primary opponent but not an election one. John Pica, a member of the Baltimore City Council, contested again for the Democratic nomination. The issue was nondiscriminatory housing legislation. Both were against it. Garmatz voted against it in the House. George Mahoney won the Democratic primary for Governor that year with the slogan, "Your home is your castle – protect it."<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> *Abilene Reporter-News*, January 20 & 30, February 13, March 14, April 3 & 22, May 1 & 3 & 6, 1966. *CQWR*, April 22, 1966, 855. *Brownwood Bulletin*, April 10, 1966.

<sup>38</sup> *The Minneapolis Star*, June 20, 1966. *CQWR*, August 20, 1965, 1664; February 18, 1966, 398-9; September 2, 1966, 1913. *The La Crosse Tribune*, February 26, 1966. *The Des Moines Register*, September 11, 1966. *The St. Cloud Daily Times*, June 4, 1966.

<sup>39</sup> *CQWR*, July 22, 1966, 1599. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, July 24, 1966.

<sup>40</sup> *CQWR*, October 21, 1966, 2541. *Waukesha Freeman*, February 21, March 25, May 16, June 21, October 31, November 1, 1966.

<sup>41</sup> *CQWR*, September 2, 1966, 1916; September 16, 1966, 2165-6. *The Evening Sun* (Baltimore), August 25, 1966.

Garmatz took his renomination easily, with 70%. But Mahoney's apparent call to violence split the Democrats, and Republican Spiro Agnew was elected Governor.

Republican McCulloch and Democrat Multer faced both primary and election races.

James Carpenter, a Lima businessman, took on McCulloch for the nomination. Either "little-known" or a "prominent Republican" depending on the newspaper, or perhaps both, Carpenter took only 20% of the vote. Nevertheless, it was the Representative's first primary challenge since his initial victory. Robert Muhlbaugh, who was McCulloch's 1964 Democratic opponent, repeated. McCulloch took 64%. Muhlbaugh ran against equal rights legislation and McCulloch's support of it. McCulloch complained that his support of these laws "cost me 25 or more votes for every one I get" and noted that his black constituents do not vote for him.<sup>42</sup> It is hard to believe that Muhlbaugh got the small black vote. The challenger ran eight points behind his earlier showing. McCulloch was reelected with 64%.

Scandal, or perhaps only Drew Pearson, plagued Multer, who was once again denied the Liberal Party nomination. The publicity was such that David Suskind, host of a nationally syndicated television talk show, announced he would run in the Democratic primary. Suskind changed his mind though, and Melvin Dubin, a manufacturer from Queens, came forward to get the "reform" Democrat endorsement. Dubin not only cast Multer as sort of a crook, but as insufficiently pro-Israel. Congressional Quarterly thought 75% of the District was Jewish, as was 100% of Multer. Multer supported Pres. Johnson's war, and Dubin came out against it, calling for a unilateral ceasefire. Perhaps if Dubin lived in the District, even more so in Brooklyn, he would have made up the 1000 votes that separated him from the Representative. As it was, Dubin challenged the results in State court and got the margin reduced to 51 votes but still came out the loser. The 39,000 voters in the Democratic primary may have been less than thrilled with Multer, but the 95,511 who reelected him in November preferred him to Republican Mary Gravina, a confidential secretary, Liberal Hershell Chanin, and Conservative Michael Spadaro. Multer's 62% was still his worst election result since 1947.<sup>43</sup>

Dague retired and Harvey was denied renomination, but the other seventeen were reelected. Is there evidence in this limited set of an off-year negative reaction to Lyndon Johnson and the Democratic Party? Certainly, Johnson's program was an issue in all the elections that were contested, which leaves out the seven cases where the incumbent was the only name on the ballot. But it is also difficult to assess the vote shift for or against the candidate when the 1964 race was also uncontested, and that leaves out four more. We are thus left with only six contests among the Class. In the four with Democratic incumbents, they ran from two to thirteen points behind their 1964 performance. In the two with Republican incumbents, they ran eight and nine points ahead. But Democrat Abbitt was no supporter of Johnson's domestic policies, even less so was the Conservative Party candidate on the ballot; Multer had his scandal; and McCulloch, the Republican, was attacked for his support of the Democratic President's positions. One should not generalize from six cases, and less so from these six.

The Republicans added a net 47 seats to their side of the aisle between the 1964 and 1966 elections, but among the Republican remainders of the Class of '46, they lost two, one to retirement and one to

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<sup>42</sup> *Lancaster Eagle-Gazette*, May 2, 1966. *The Cincinnati Enquirer*, February 3, 1966. *CQWR*, October 21, 1966, 2531. *Springfield Leader and Press*, November 3, 1966.

<sup>43</sup> *CQWR*, January 28, 1966, 319; June 17, 1966, 1307; September 2, 1966, 1928; September 30, 1966, 2278.

another Republican. The Class now stood at 15 Democrats and 2 Republicans. Nine of the Democrats were from the South.

Members of the Class of '46 who did not return to the House after 1966:

Paul Dague served on the Agriculture Committee all of his ten terms, but achieved ranking status only in his last term. Presumably he had influence on agricultural policy, but his visible legislative performance was low. None of his 60 public bills were enacted and only one of his eleven resolutions, and it was a eulogy. His floor participation was low, 159 events, and he moved one amendment, which was on the Defense Production Act; it was accepted. Six of his 29 private bills became law. Perhaps the fact that he was the one member of the Class who never changed his House office seems consistent with his apparent energy level. On key votes Dague was with Republicans 281 times, Democrats 28 times (twelve with only Northerners, eight with Southerners), and missed 19 votes. He was contrary in opposing aid to Greece and Turkey, the State Department information service, repeal of the oleo tax, the Colorado River project, and a salary increase for federal employees. His rated voting was in the center of Class Republicans.

Ralph Harvey missed most of the first session of the 80<sup>th</sup> Congress and the entire 86<sup>th</sup> Congress but had a floor participation rate one-third greater than Dague's at 374. Still their legislative output was similar. None of Harvey's 77 public bills were enacted and none of 20 resolutions. He did move seven floor amendments, and two were accepted, addressing rural telephone service, and agency reporting. Two of his fifteen private bills became law. He also served on the Agriculture Committee but for seven terms. Beyond that he was concerned with air pollution; he was not against it. His autobiography showed a passion for junkets. Harvey voted 246 times with Republicans, 25 with Democrats (twelve with Southerners, three with Northerners), and missed 20. He was contrary on Interim Foreign Aid and the Trade Agreements Extension Act. He was on the conservative side of the center of Class Republicans.